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Impact of German Sources of Capital on the Namibian Economy  
 
Abstract: This work examines the impact of German sources of capital on the Namibian 
economy. Two sets of equations are tested. The first set tests the effect that German development 
assistance and German capital goods have had on domestic GDP. The second set tests the effect 
of German development assistance on the Namibian government’s capital formation outlays. The 
German independent variables are subsequently compared to global sources of capital in order 
to determine whether the German sources demonstrate a comparatively higher significance. 
Furthermore, the effects of official development assistance are disaggregated by type to test for 
aid’s fungibility. This analysis enables us not only to determine the direct impact of German 
sources of capital on the Namibian economy but also the extent to which official development 
assistance impacts the government’s investment behavior. We find that German development 
assistance has practically no effect on Namibian GDP. However, German development aid does 
have a statistically significant effect on the Namibian government’s level of annual expenditure 
on capital formation. Our results lead to the conclusion that German development aid has the 
potential, through public investment, to exert a positive influence over the Namibian economy. 
Further research will need to explore the conditions under which this potential can be fulfilled. 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The southern African country of 
Namibia was once a colony of the German 
Empire and the history of the dire 
exploitation that was German colonialism in 
Namibia has been thoroughly documented. 
As a result of the famous “Scramble for 
Africa,” the Germans sought to control 
Namibia in a struggle that ended with 
several cases of genocide.
1
 Today, Germany 
is Namibia’s second greatest donor of 
development aid and the countries’ relations, 
at least on the official level, are said to be 
flourishing.
2
 In 1989, the German Bundestag 
                                                          
1
 See, for instance, JONASSOHN, Kurt & Karin 
SOLVEIG BJÖRNSON. Genocide and Gross 
Human Rights Violations in: In Comparative 
Perspective. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1998. 
2
 Namibia. Federal Foreign Office [online], 2016. 
[cit. 2016-01-01]. Available at: 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-
Nodes/Namibia_node.html 
enacted a resolution that underlined 
Germany’s historical and political 
responsibility towards Namibia. After 1990, 
the countries’ relationship has been 
solidified by a number of high-profile visits. 
In 1995, German chancellor Helmut Kohl 
paid the former colony a visit and in March 
1998, German president Roman Herzog 
followed suit. The tide of official visits from 
Germany continued with the president of the 
Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse and foreign 
minister Joschka Fischer, both of which 
visited Namibia in 2003. Namibian officials, 
if the number of official visits can be 
interpreted as a reliable indicator, accorded 
to the bilateral relationship equally high 
importance. Namibian president Sam 
Nujoma visited Germany three times (1996, 
2000, and 2002), Namibian prime ministers 
did so on four occasions (Geingob: 1997, 
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2000, and 2000, Angula: 2011).
3
 To list the 
other official visits would no doubt 
underscore the point that the German-
Namibian  political relationship enjoys 
careful attention on both sides but it would 
also reach beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, let us mention that when it comes 
to the delegations accompanying official 
visits, the economic ministers (trade and 
industry, tourism, economic cooperation and 
development) usually occupy the front seats. 
Both countries seem to be interested in 
deepening of their economic ties and 
exchanges of visits by officials responsible 
for economic policy continued as recently as 
July 2015. This illustrates the fact that the 
German-Namibian ties have, and, as will be 
evidenced later, have always had, an 
important economic dimension. In 2014, 
bilateral trade between Germany and 
Namibia amounted to approximately 274 
million euros. In aggregate terms, German 
foreign direct investment in Namibia nears 
90 million euros.
4
 An investment promotion 
and protection agreement as well as a double 
taxation accord are in force. Official 
development assistance (ODA) has, most 
prominently after 1990, played a crucial role 
in the governments’ relationship. The 
German foreign office’s official data claim 
that over 800 million euros have been 
provided to Namibia for the purpose of 
development cooperation since 1990. This 
represents the highest per capita rate paid by 
                                                          
3
 KATJAVIVI, Peter H. Namibia’s bilateral relations 
with Germany: A crucial relationship in BÖSL, 
Anton, André DU PISANI a Dennis U. 
ZAIRE. Namibia's Foreign Relations: Historic 
contexts, current dimensions, and perspectives for 
the 21st century. Windhoek, Namibia: Macmillan 
Education Namibia, 2014. ISBN 9789991626109, pp. 
143 - 145 
4
 Namibia. Federal Foreign Office [online], 2016. 
[cit. 2016-01-01]. Available at: 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-
Nodes/Namibia_node.html 
Germany to an African country.
5
 
Importantly, German development aid to 
Namibia has been devoted to a number of 
areas; resources are being utilized in 
construction of educational and cultural 
facilities, too. Currently, three priorities 
have been identified: management of natural 
resources, transport, and sustainable 
economic development.
6
 
Despite voluminous literature on the 
topic, a consensus regarding development 
aid’s effectiveness has not been reached. In 
the case of the German-Namibian 
relationship however, such consensus is 
unavailable not necessarily because 
academics present differing results, but 
rather because too few studies on the topic 
of German development aid to Namibia 
have been written. Even though this is 
partially explained by the fact that Namibia 
remains a young country,
7
 the degree to 
which this relationship remains 
underresearched is striking. Namibia’s data 
have by now reached both the necessary 
volume as well as considerable reliability 
and their analysis is long overdue.  
Therefore, this study will consider 
the extent to which German development aid 
exerts influence on the Namibian economy. 
However, we will focus on German sources 
of capital in a broader sense of the word and 
the analysis of German official development 
assistance will be supplemented by that of 
German exports of capital goods to Namibia 
or, conversely, Namibian imports of German 
capital goods. An adjusted Cobb-Douglas 
production function will be employed to 
quantify the effect of the two 
aforementioned variables  (German ODA 
and German capital goods) on Namibia’s 
GDP. To provide a comparative measure of 
                                                          
5
 ibid., p. 1 
6
 ibid., p. 1 
7
 In 2015, Namibia celebrated its 25
th
 Independence 
Day. 
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the relative importance of German sources 
of capital, an analogical analysis will be 
conducted for aggregate (world) ODA to 
Namibia and aggregate imports of capital 
goods. Furthermore, official development 
assistance will be disaggregated by type to 
test for aid’s fungibility. Subsequently, we 
will develop a simple model for the 
Namibian government’s annual outlays 
towards capital formation to test the role of 
German ODA in its determination. The 
comparison between the effect exerted by 
ODA on the entire economy and that exerted 
on the government’s spending behavior will 
not only enhance our understanding of 
German ODA’s various effects, it will also 
shed some light on a potential channel 
(government investment expenditure) 
through which development aid operates.  
This paper is organized in the 
following fashion: first, two sections of 
literature review follow the indtroduction, 
each of which focuses on a different  aspect 
concerning the provision of German capital 
to the Namibian economy. Specifically, we 
will review the general scholarly debate 
surrounding the topic of official 
development assistance as well as literature 
concerning the relationship between official 
development assistance and government 
expenditure. Second, the importance of 
official development assistence in the 
bilateral relationship between Germany and 
Namibia is elucidated. Third, a brief 
overview of the Namibian economy is 
presented, so that the reader can make sense 
of the reasoning employed and the 
conclusions reached later in the paper.  
Fourth, the theoretical models used in this 
paper will be elucidated and potential limits 
of the data used for the purpose of this study 
will be introduced. Lastly, we will discuss 
the results and conclude the paper by 
reiterating the important findings and 
providing suggestions for future research. 
 
 
Literature Review  
Though this study is primarily 
concerned with the impact of German 
sources of capital on the Namibian 
economy, it is imperative that we see our 
research from a broader perspective. 
Namely, we attempt to diversify and 
broaden previous literature by adding new 
variables to established models as well as by 
suggesting a simplified model of our own. 
Therefore, this section clarifies the novelty 
of our research with respect to previously 
published literature.  
 
A General Overview of the Foreign Aid 
Debate 
The debate over development aid is 
probably as old as development assistance 
itself. The literature on foreign aid can, for 
the sake of simplicity, be divided in three 
distinct parts. First, a considerable amount 
of research has been devoted to the proper 
definition and understanding of foreign 
development aid, which has proven 
particularly important for further research 
objectives. Second, a great amount of debate 
has taken place with respect to foreign 
development aid’s effects on the receiving 
countries and, subsequently, aid’s 
effectiveness. Lastly, scholars have 
attempted to identify the factors that 
determine who gives to whom. 
A classical understanding of the role 
that foreign development aid performs in a 
developing country’s economy was 
suggested by Chenery and Strout who put 
forth the notion that aid is best understood as 
a low-cost source of capital that improves 
domestic savings and investment, and thus 
represents an attractive proposition for 
developing countries.
8
 Chenery and Strout’s 
                                                          
8 CHENERY, H. B. and STROUT, A. (1966) Foreign 
Assistance and Economic Development, American 
Economic Review, vol. 56. 
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theoretical framework is an instance of a 
relatively straightforward and simple model 
that marks the beginning of the academic 
debate on foreign aid. 
 Another simple model that gained 
currency in the early days of foreign aid 
research is the Harrod-Domar model which 
assumes a stable linear relationship between 
growth and investment in physical capital.
9
 
The assumption that all aid is invested leads 
to a straightforward estimation of how much 
aid is needed to achieve a particular level of 
economic growth. The empirical studies that 
followed in the footsteps of these early 
models thus focused on the extent to which 
aid is capable of boosting savings and 
investment. A number of seminal studies by 
Papanek may serve as examples.
10
  
The empirical work described above, 
paradoxically, showed that aid tends to 
increase savings but not necessarily in the 
simple and linear fashion suggested by 
Harrod-Domar. The empirical studies of this 
generation, one may dare to conclude, 
refuted their own theoretical underpinings 
by evidencing that an important portion of 
aid is consumed rather than invested.  
                                                                                       
 
9 HARROD, Roy F. An Essay in Dynamic 
Theory. The Economic Journal. 1939, 49(193), 14-. 
DOI: 10.2307/2225181. ISSN 00130133. Available 
at:http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2225181?origi
n=crossref 
DOMAR, Evsey D. Capital Expansion, Rate of 
Growth, and Employment. Econometrica. 
1946, 14(2), 137-. DOI: 10.2307/1905364. ISSN 
00129682. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1905364?origin=crossref 
 
10
 PAPANEK, Gustav F. (1972). ‘The Effect of Aid 
and Other Resource Transfers on Savings and 
Growth in Less Developed Countries’. Economic 
Journal, 82 (327), pp. 935–50. 
PAPANEK, Gustav F. (1973). ‘Aid, Foreign Private 
Investment, Savings, and Growth in Less 
Developed Countries’. Journal of Political Economy, 
81 (1), pp. 120–30. 
Subsequent studies that saw the light 
of day largely during the 1980s therefore 
attempted to present an alternative 
understanding of foreign aid. Specifically, 
one line of thought assumed that aid could 
exert influence on economic growth through 
investment. In that sense, focus on capital 
accumulation was retained. Hansen and 
Tarp, in their study of the foreign aid 
literature, conclude that studies subscribing 
to this line of thought were able to produce 
results that were on the one hand relatively 
robust, yet still theoretically conflicting.
11
 
Namely, a positive relationship between aid 
and investment was corroborated while clear 
evidence establishing a link between savings 
and economic growth over time was 
missing.  
A truly novel challenge to the 
aforementioned studies thus came from 
Easterly, who  argues that growth is less 
related to physical capital investment than is 
often assumed.
12
 This argument proves 
relatively weak in the case of Namibia but 
Easterly’s critique undoubtedly ushered in a 
new perspective on the nature of 
development aid.  
Jepma presents an impressive 
overview of foreign aid literature that leads 
the author to a more complicated conclusion 
when it comes to the nature of development 
aid. His work illustrates that the 
understanding of aid as a decisively positive 
independent variable that exerts causal 
effects on the receiving country’s economy 
                                                          
11
 HANSEN, H., and F. TARP (2000). ‘Aid 
Effectiveness Disputed’. Journal of International 
Development, 12 (3), pp. 375–98. 
12
 EASTERLY, W. (1999). ‘The Ghost of Financing 
Gap: Testing the Growth Model Used in the 
International Financial Institutions’. Journal of 
Development Economics, 60 (2), pp. 
423–38. 
EASTERLY, W. (2003). ‘Can Foreign Aid Buy 
Growth?’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 
(3), pp. 23–48. 
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is incomplete at best. In fact, as Jepma 
demonstrates, simplified empirical 
methodology cannot explain whether a 
country suffers economic hardship because 
of mismanaged sources of cheap capital or 
whether a country receives this form of 
augmentation precisely because of economic 
underperformance.  
Thus, the interaction between foreign 
aid provision and economic development is 
one where the exact causal links cannot be 
identified easily.
13
 This problem was raised 
by scholars such as Mosley et al. at the 
beginning of the 1990s.
14
  
It was at the beginning of the last 
decade of the twentieth century that scholars 
finally reflected on the palpable weaknesses 
of past theory and introduced models that 
take into account the potential non-linear 
relationship between foreign aid and 
economic growth as well as the endogeneity 
of aid. A truly  influential paper by Burnside 
and Dollar (Easterly claims that it has, in a 
self-fulfilling prophetic manner, influenced 
actual aid policies)
15
 suggests that aid can 
work as long as recipient states pursue 
“good policies.”16 Rajan and Subramanian 
write that the standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function as well as assumptions 
that aid mainly augments investment in 
                                                          
13
 JEPMA, Catrinus J. On the Effectiveness of 
Development Aid. World Bank, Unpublished. 1997. 
Discussed in ALESINA, Alberto a David DOLLAR. 
Journal of Economic Growth [online]. 2000, vol. 5, 
issue 1, pp. 33-63 [cit. 2015-04-12]. DOI: 
10.1023/a:1009874203400. 
14
 MOSLEY, P., J. HUDSON, and S. HORRELL 
(1992). ‘Aid, the Public Sector and the Market in 
Less Developed Countries: A Return to the Scene of 
the Crime’. Journal of International Development, 4 
(2), pp. 139–50. 
15
 EASTERLY, W. (2003). ‘Can Foreign Aid Buy 
Growth?’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (3), 
pp. 23–48. 
16
 BURNSIDE, Craig., and David DOLLAR (2000). 
‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’. American Economic 
Review, 90 (4), pp. 847–68. 
physical capital while having little effect on 
productivity can be useful but our 
expectations regarding aid’s impact on 
growth should be modest.
17
 Dalgaard and 
Erickson, who employ an augmented Solow-
Swan growth model, agree that expectations 
regarding foreing aid’s potency have simply 
been too high.
18
  
The most recent studies employ 
techniques such as dynamic panel GMM 
methods which are supposed to a) account 
for unit-level fixed effects b) incorporate 
internal methods for dealing with 
endogenous regressors and c) avoid the bias 
of standard panel estimators in dynamic 
settings.
19
  
Recent literature has also suggested 
that the “black box” of political economy 
needs to be opened in order to enrich the 
debate on the nature and dynamics of 
foreign aid.
20
 The view that quantitative 
analyses have to be complemented by 
country-specific observations from the field 
of political economy is one that is shared by 
the author of this study. 
                                                          
17
 RAJAN, Raghuram G., and Arvind 
SUBRAMANIAN. Aid and Growth: What Does the 
Cross-Country Evidence Really Show? The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 90 (4). 2008, pp. 643–
65. 
 
18
 DALGAARD, Carl-Johan and Lennart 
ERICKSON. Reasonable Expectations and the First 
Millennium Development Goal: How Much Can Aid 
Achieve? World Development [online]. 2009, 37(7), 
1170-1181 [cit. 2016-03-08]. DOI: 
10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.11.003. ISSN 0305750x. 
Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0305750
X08003173 
19
 ARNDT, C., S. JONES, and F. TARP (2007). ‘Aid 
and Development: The Mozambican Case’. In S. 
Lahiri (ed.), Frontiers of Economics and 
Globalization: Theory and Practice of Foreign Aid. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, p. 4 
20
 BOURGUIGNON, F., and M. SUNDBERG 
(2007). ‘Aid Effectiveness: Opening the Black Box’. 
American Economic Review, 97 (2), pp. 316–21. 
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Let us consider the question of 
whether or not development aid has been an 
effective strategy for boosting developing 
countries‘ growth. In 1987, Paul Mosley 
ambitiously summarized decades of 
empirical resarch by concluding that even 
though instances of aid effectiveness on the 
microeconomic level are not necessarily 
rare, an aggregate positive effect of aid on 
the macroeconomic level is hard to 
identify.
21
 He termed his observation the 
micro-macro paradox, which challenged the 
work of such researchers as Papenek,
22
 
whose work had long dominated the field. 
Articles that attest to the failure of 
development aid abound. Boone has reached 
the conclusion that foreign aid’s effects on 
growth and investment are negligible, 
controlling for the endogeneity of aid 
flows.
23
 In an already mentioned 
contribution, Burnside and Dollar examine 
the interaction between aid and policies that 
promote growth, arguably in the neoclassical 
framework.
24
 In their specification of the 
growth equation, Burnside and Dollar 
incorporate a wide range of institutional and 
policy variables that have been claimed to 
                                                          
21
 MOSLEY, P. (1987). Overseas Aid: Its Defence 
and Reform. Brighton: Wheatshead Books. 
22
 PAPANEK, Gustav F. (1972). ‘The Effect of Aid 
and Other Resource Transfers on Savings and 
Growth in Less Developed Countries’. Economic 
Journal, 82 (327), pp. 935–50. 
PAPANEK, Gustav F. (1973). ‘Aid, Foreign Private 
Investment, Savings, and Growth in Less 
Developed Countries’. Journal of Political Economy, 
81 (1), pp. 120–30. 
23
 BOONE, P. The Impact of Foreign Aid on Savings 
and Growth. London School of Economics, mimeo. 
1994. 
BOONE, P. Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign 
Aid. European Economic Review 40. 1996, pp. 289-
329. 
24
 TSIKATA, T. (1998). ‘Aid Effectiveness – A 
Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature’. 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper 98/1, 
International Monetary Fund, p. 13 
explain growth performance of poor 
countries. The OLS estimation of that 
specification (which used panel data for 
forty low-income countries over six-year 
periods from the beginning of the 1970s to 
the beginning of the 1990s) found that 
institutional quality, inflation, and trade 
openess were the most important variables 
affecting growth. The effect of aid, our main 
interest, was found insignificant for 
countries with average policies. Estimates of 
the effect of aid for countries with good 
policies were invariably positive. In a more 
recent contribution, Rajan and Subramanian 
write that foreign aid’s effects on receiving 
countries can hardly be deemed 
systematic.
25
 Finally, the Zambian 
economist Dambisa Moyo argues for a 
complete cessation of development aid 
provision.
26
 Recognizing that proving solid 
positive effects on the receiving economies 
may not be a viable strategy, numerous 
scholars have attempted to reframe the 
debate. Albert O. Hirschman has cautioned 
before the so-called perversity thesis which 
claims that development aid creates ample 
opportunities for moral hazard when a 
receiving country delays the necessary 
reforms precisely because it can afford to do 
so thanks to capital injections from abroad.
27
 
Herbst, opposing Hirschman’s view, has 
provided extensive evidence in this respect, 
presenting examples such as poor revenue 
                                                          
25
 RAJAN, Raghuram G., and Arvind 
SUBRAMANIAN. Aid and Growth: What Does the 
Cross-Country Evidence Really Show? The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 90 (4). 2008, pp. 643–
65. 
26
 MOYO, Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not 
Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009. 
27
 HIRSCHMAN, Albert O. 1991. The Rhetoric of 
Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. Cambridge, 
Mass.:Belknap Press. 
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mobilization or infrastructure construction.
28
 
Goldsmith  has embraced Hirschman’s 
stance by suggesting that his “main concern 
is not national economic performance, the 
usual focus in the debate over the 
effectiveness of aid, but political 
performance.”29  
Lastly, literature has been devoted to 
the seminal question of who gives to whom. 
Donor motivation is related to our topic only 
tangentially and we will thus merely suggest 
the main fault lines that define the debate. 
One of these fault lines is of a remarkably 
normative undertone. This normative line of 
thought which suggests that it is the poorer 
countries that are on the receiving end 
(following Chenery and Strout’s 1966 logic) 
has, however, not found much empirical 
support. Quite to the contrary, voluminous 
literature has shown that other factors such 
as colonial history and, or, strategic 
objectives take the place of the most 
important determinant.
30
 In the case of the 
German-Namibian relationship, this 
proclivity is illustrated by Amavilah.
31
  
The goal of the present study is not 
to introduce an entirely novel theoretical 
framework for studying the effects of 
German sources of capital on the Namibian 
economy. Rather, its ambition is to 
                                                          
28
 HERBST, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: 
Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
ISBN 06-910-1028-5. 
29
 GOLDSMITH, Arthur A. Financial Aid and 
Statehood in Africa. International Organization. vol. 
55, issue 1. DOI: 10.1162/002081801551432, p. 124 
 
30
 MAIZELS, Alfred and Machiko K. NISSANKE. 
Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries. World 
Development. 1984,12(9), 879-900. 
31
 AMAVILAH, Voxi H. German Aid and Trade 
versus Namibian GDP and Labour Productivity. 
Applied Economics [online]. 1998, vol. 30, issue 5, s. 
689-695 [cit. 2015-04-12]. DOI: 
10.1080/000368498325679. 
 
supplement  the scholarship of the German-
Namibian relationship with a quantitative 
analysis of previously unavailable data. The 
data pool has by now reached sufficient 
maturity and reliability and it is thus 
imperative that it be analyzed. 
 
Foreign Aid and Public Investment 
As has been illustrated in the course 
of the general review of the foreign aid 
debate presented above, scholars have found 
it difficult to reach a consensus on foreign 
aid’s effects and effectiveness on the macro 
level. Apart from questions of methodology 
and data reliability, the matter at hand may 
also prove elusive because scholars have 
often focused on a relatively narrow 
spectrum of effects. Out study thus 
considers not only the effect of German aid 
on Namibian GPD but also its impact on the 
Namibian central government’s public 
investment expenditure.   
The impact of foreign aid inflows on 
government fiscal behavior is of crucial 
importance. First, it represents an important 
way in which foreign aid donors can 
influence the governments of developing 
countries as well as the policies that these 
governments pursue. Naturally, questions of 
sovereignty as well as ethics enter into the 
picture, but these are beyond the scope of 
our present study. Second, and this is 
particularly relevant in our case study, the 
fiscal behavior of the governments of 
recipient countries represents perhaps the 
most direct and indeed, most important, 
channel through which foreign aid 
influences the domestic economy. Lastly, in 
order to determine aid’s effectivness, the 
issue of fungibility cannot be left unheeded.  
Fungibility refers to aid’s monetary 
nature which enables governments to use it, 
despite various control mechanisms, in the 
ways that they see most appropriate. For all 
these reasons, studying the impact of foreign 
aid on government expenditure in general 
Vladimir Chlouba 
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and public investment in particular is likely 
to provide an additional perspective on the 
matter at hand. Two major questions can be 
entertained when it comes to governments’ 
spending behavior and foreing aid. The first 
has already been foreshadowed and it 
pertains to aid’s fungibility. The degree to 
which aid may induce the government to 
increase its consumption rather than 
investment is an important subject of 
enquiry.  
Another question concerns the 
indirect effects that aid may exert on 
governments’ behavior. For instance, 
voluminous literature has been produced 
that considers the degree to which 
governments’ ability to mobilize domestic 
revenue decreases with increasing levels of 
foreign aid disbursements.
32
 This is because 
aid merely substitutes domestic tax revenue. 
In this particular case, studies focused on 
aid’s effects on economic growth may not 
detect any major influence despite the fact 
that aid does have important impact on the 
recipient country or, at least, its government.  
Another question worth studying is 
that of aid illusion. This notion suggests that 
aid calculations disregard the fact that 
development projecs initially financed by 
foreign aid will subsequently require 
additional public investment due to 
expenditures on maintenance, etc. On the 
one hand, this fact is likely to be reflected in 
government expenditure. On the other hand, 
it may lead to a misunderstanding of the 
value that aid actually provides.
33
  
  Some of the most influential studies 
that have enriched the abovespecified debate 
                                                          
32
 MCGILLIVRAY, M. and O. MORRISSEY (2001). 
A Review of Evidence on the Fiscal Effects of Aid. 
CREDIT Research Paper 01/13, University of 
Nottingham. 
33
 MCGILLIVRAY, M. and O. MORRISSEY (2000). 
A Review of Evidence on the Fiscal Effects of Aid. 
CREDIT Research Paper 01/13, University of 
Nottingham. 
are presented in a lucid manner by 
McGillivray and Morrissey.
34
 Pack & Pack  
focused their study, which assesses the 
impact of foreign aid on various kinds of 
government expenditure, on Indonesia.
35
 
They find a clearly positive effect on 
developoment expenditure. In their 1993 
paper however, Pack & Pack find that in the 
Dominican Republic, the impact of aid on 
development expenditure was slightly 
negative. Gupta, publishing in 1993 his 
study of India, finds that foreign aid impacts 
development expenditure in a positive 
manner.
36
 Lastly, in an important 1998 
study, Feyzioglu et al. considered data on 
fourteen least developed countries.
37
 They 
find a positive impact of ODA on total 
government expenditure, development 
expenditure, and investment expenditure. 
 Even though the conclusion that 
foreign aid has a positive impact on 
development and investment expenditure is 
more or less supported by the studies 
summarized above, they, too, have 
undeniable limits. Above all the studies 
relying on cross-sectional data (such as that 
of Feyzioglu et al.) do not enable us to 
consider country-specific conditions which 
are likely to play an important role. Whereas 
the Feyzioglu et al. study relies on a 
methodological framework characterized by 
a system of linear expenditure equations 
derived from a utility maximization problem 
                                                          
34
 MCGILLIVRAY, M. and O. MORRISSEY (2001). 
Aid Illusion and Public Sector Fiscal Behavior. 
CREDIT Research Paper 00/9, University of 
Nottingham. 
35
 PACK, H. and J.R. PACK (1990), ‘Is Foreign Aid 
Fungible? The Case of Indonesia’, Economic 
Journal, 100, 188-194. 
36
 GUPTA, K. (1993), ‘Sectoral Fungibility of 
Foreign Aid in India’, mimeo, University of Alberta. 
37
 FEYZIOGLU, T., V. SWAROOP and M. ZHU 
(1998), ‘A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of 
Foreign Aid’, World Bank Economic Review, 12:1, 
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(the utility function is maximized subject to 
a budget constraint), others (Pack & Pack) 
do not rely on any explicit theoretical 
framework.  
A series of other studies have 
employed a different, arguably more 
complex, theoretical framework. This 
framework also relies on utility 
maximization but the utility function is 
defined as deviations of the studied variables 
from government targets, which are 
specified as the budgeted figures. In spite of 
this, literature of this second kind points in 
multiple directions. In fact, the most 
influential studies are divided about equally 
when it comes to the arithmetic sign of aid’s 
impact on public investment. Franco-
Rodriguez
38
, McGillivray & Ahmed
39
, and 
McGillivray & Ouattara
40
 all find a negative 
effect of development aid on public 
investment. Franco-Rodriguez et al.
41
, Khan 
                                                          
38
 FRANCO-RODRIGUEZ, S. (2000), ‘Recent 
Advances in Fiscal Response Models with an 
Application to Costa Rica’, Journal of International 
Development, 12:3, 429-442. 
39
 MCGILLIVRAY, Mark a Akhter AHMED. Aid, 
Adjustment and Public Sector Fiscal Behaviour in the 
Philippines. Journal of the Asia Pacific 
Economy [online]. 1999, 4(2), 381-391 [cit. 2016-03-
09]. DOI: 10.1080/13547869908724687. ISSN 1354-
7860. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/135478
69908724687 
40
 MCGILLIVRAY, M. and B. OUATTARA (2005). 
Aid, Debt Burden and Government Fiscal Behaviour 
in Cote d’Ivoire. Journal of African Economies, 
14(2), pp. 247-269. 
41
 FRANCO-RODRIGUEZ, Susana, Mark 
MCGILLIVRAY and Oliver MORRISSEY. Aid and 
the Public Sector in Pakistan: Evidence with 
Endogenous Aid.CREDIT Research Paper. 
1998, 98(2). Available 
at:https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/credit/documents/pa
pers/98-02.pdf 
 
& Hoshino,
42
 and Heller
43
 published studies 
that report the opposite finding. To 
complicate matters further, Iqbal, in his 
study of Pakistan, finds no impact of aid on 
government investment whatsoever.
44
 Even 
though the above mentioned studies 
incorporated data on countries in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, no clear 
consensus seems to have emerged. This is 
arguably due to the fact that country-specific 
variables are likely to be of high importance.  
Let us lastly mention two important 
studies that consider the effect of 
disaggregated aid. Mavrotas studied 
Uganda’s data to determine the effect of 
project aid, programme aid, technical 
assistance, and food aid on dependent 
variables such as tax revenue, public 
investment, public consumption, and 
domestic borrowing.
45
 Government 
investment was positively influenced by 
programme aid and technical assistance. 
Food aid and project aid had, on the other 
hand, a negative impact on public 
investment. In 2006, Mavrotas and Ouattara 
studied the case of Cote d’Ivoire to find out 
that aggregated aid and project aid had a 
                                                          
42
 KHAN, Haider Ali a Eiichi HOSHINO. Impact of 
Foreign Aid on the Fiscal Behavior of LDC 
Governments: Evidence with Endogenous 
Aid. World Development. 1992, 20(10), 1481-1488. 
DOI: 10.1016/0305-750X(92)90068-7. ISSN 
0305750x. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0305750X
92900687 
43
 HELLER, P.S. (1975), ‘A Model of Public Fiscal 
Behaviour in Developing Countries: Aid, Investment 
and Taxation’, American Economic Review, 65, 429-
445. 
44
 IQBAL, Zafar. Foreign Aid and the Public Sector: 
A Model of Fiscal Behaviour in Pakistan. The 
Pakistan Development Review. 1997, 36(2), 115-129. 
Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41260027 
45
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negative impact on public investment but a 
positive effect on public consumption.
46
 
Programme aid, technical assistance, and 
food aid, on the other hand, had a positive 
impact on public investment and a negative 
impact on public consumption.  
Despite being far from conclusive, 
this review has evidenced that a) aid has a 
variety of effects beyond its immediate 
(although according to some studies non-
existent) impact on economic growth, b) aid 
has in a number of cases proved its ability to 
boost government expenditure (in general as 
well as its consumption subsection) and 
drive down public investment, and c) 
detailed studies of individual countries are 
necessary to provide additional 
understanding that is unlikely to be derived 
from large-scale panel studies. It is the 
ambition of this work to be such a case 
study. 
 
An Overview of the Namibian Economy 
 
 Namibia’s is a relatively small 
economy – domestic consumption relies on 
the country’s population of two million. 
Furthermore, the informal economy is 
relatively sizable and the rate of 
unemployment tends to stubbornly stay in 
the double digits. This means that Namibia’s 
economy is dependent on external markets, 
given its rich production of raw materials. 
 The country is thus vulnerable to 
external shocks which are usually channeled 
in two ways. The first is at times 
considerable fluctuation of the prices of raw 
materials, particularly uranium, zinc, and 
diamonds. The second is Namibia’s trade 
relationship with South Africa, which 
                                                          
46
 MAVROTAS, G. and B. OUATTARA (2006). Aid 
Disaggregation and the Public Sector in Aid-
Recipient Economies: Some Evidence from Cote 
d’Ivoire. Review of Development Economics, 10(3), 
434-451. 
provides a decisive majority of imports and 
foreign direct investment. 
 As is obvious from Chart 1, which 
depicts the annual growth of GDP between 
the years 1995 and 2014 in both Namibia 
and the entire southern African region, 
Namibia has, especially in the recent years, 
outperformed its neighbors. In 2009 for 
instance, when the entire region fell into a 
recession caused by the global financial 
crisis, Namibia weathered the storm 
comparatively well and maintained 
moderate growth. Since 2010, the country 
resumed fast growth, which in 2014 reached 
6.4% annually. Forecasts for 2015, 2016, 
and 2017 remain positive with 5.0%, 5.5%, 
and 5.9%, respectively.
47
   
With 60%, the services sector 
remained the greatest contributor to 
Namibia’s GDP in 2014.48  The sector’s 
growth slowed to 6.0% in 2014 from the 
previous figure of 6.5%, which was recorded 
in 2013.
49
  According to the African 
Economic Outlook, this development is 
attributed to a slowdown in tourism.
50
  The 
secondary sector (industry and mining) 
accounted in 2014 for roughly 20% of the 
economy and continued to grow at fast rates, 
mainly due to construction.
51
  The 
agricultural sector, which likewise accounts 
for about 20% of the Namibian economy, 
demonstrated almost insignificant growth in 
2014 due to weakly performing agriculture 
and comparatively slower growth in mining.  
                                                          
47
 World Bank estimates, available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-
economic-
prospects/data?variable=NYGDPMKTPKDZ&region
=SST 
48
 data from domestic authorities, summarized in the 
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Table 1 details the representation of 
various sectors in the Namibian economy. 
The importance of agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting declined between 2009 
and 2013 but clearly, fishing remains an 
important source of exports with 3.1% of 
GDP at current prices. Mining and quarrying 
increased its share of GDP from 11.8% in 
2009 to 14.0% in 2013. Wholesale and retail 
trade, together with repair of vehicles, 
household goods, as well as restaurants and 
hotels, did not necessarily expand during the 
2009 – 2013 period. What did claim an 
increased share of Namibia’s GDP however, 
was public administration and defense, 
which climbed from 11.0 to 13.0% of the  
gross domestic product.  
This brief overview of the 
importance of various sectors of the 
Namibian economy confirms the results of 
Humavindu and Stage, who studied the 
country’s economy based on input-output 
and Social Accounting Matrix analyses. 
They find that mining and government 
services are key sectors.
52
 As has been 
mentioned above, Namibia has some of the 
largest deposits of diamonds, uranium, and 
zinc on Earth and mining thus remains an 
industry capable of boosting Namibia’s 
growth. The African Development Bank’s 
analysis of Namibia’s economy forecasts 
that “medium term growth outlook remains 
positive as external demand improves and 
new mines start production.”53 Clearly 
however, the mining industry is outward 
oriented and a slowdown of the global 
economy, which today could easily be 
                                                          
52
 HUMAVINDU, Michael N and Jesper STAGE. 
Key Sectors of the Namibian Economy. Journal of 
Economic Structures. 2013, 2(1), 1-. DOI: 
10.1186/2193-2409-2-1. ISSN 2193-2409. Available 
at: 
http://www.journalofeconomicstructures.com/content
/2/1/1 
53
 African Economic Outlook: Namibia. African 
Development Bank, OECD, UNDP, 2015, p. 4 
unleashed by China’s troubling 
transformation to an economy driven by 
domestic consumption, would be palpably 
evident in Namibia as well.  
Namibia’s dependence on its mining 
industry, it must be added, is not the only 
source of its exposition to external risk. The 
country’s dependence on South Africa is just 
as significant. Underpinned by a monetary 
policy that pegs the Namibian dollar to the 
South African rand, Namibia does most of 
its business with Pretoria. In 2013, South 
Africa accounted for about 27% of 
Namibia’s exports, most of which consisted 
of beverages, beef, live animals, and fish. 
The country’s South African imports, 
however, are the true measure of its 
dependence on the southern neighbor. South 
Africa represents about 62% of Namibia’s 
imports. Importantly, these imports range 
from vehicles, fuel, and pharmaceuticals to 
very mundane products such as food and 
household utensils.
54
 Clearly, these statistics 
evidence extensive dependency on the part 
of Namibia.  
Other important destinations for 
Namibia’s exports are the Euro area and 
Botswana. Botswana, where the trade 
counter of the large diamond company De 
Beers is located, is an important destination 
of diamond exports. Let us lastly mention 
that minerals, among which diamonds are 
crucial, account for a total of 45% of 
Namibia’s exports.55 The current account 
balance, which had long developed in a 
negative fashion, finally showed signs of 
improvement in 2014. This was due to 
narrowing merchandise deficit and 
considerable capital inflows. The overall 
balance of payments moved in the third 
quarter of 2014 from a deficit to a surplus of 
640 million Namibian dollars.
56
 Foreign 
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direct investment, which mainly flows into 
Namibia’s mining industry, continued to 
show positive numbers in 2013 and 
accounted for 5.6% of GDP. This statistic 
put the country ahead of Mauritius, South 
Africa, and Botswana, Namibia’s main 
competitors.
57
 
Table 2 brings the reader’s attention 
to Namibia’s public finances. Compared to 
other peer countries in the region, Windhoek 
prides itself on comparatively high levels of 
revenue mobilization. Tax revenue has 
steadily increased as share of GDP and now 
regularly represents close to a third of the 
gross domestic product. Current 
expenditures of the government, together 
with expenses devoted to wages and salaries 
however, have also grown at a relatively fast 
pace. If we consider the fact that capital 
expenditure has somewhat dwindled (and 
continues to do so in the African 
Development Bank’s forecast), we conclude 
that the government’s finances are not 
necessarily on a healthy path. Particularly 
publicly owned enterprises, which manage 
the country’s water and electricity supply as 
well as other key sectors, have performed 
quite poorly and often sought last resort in 
the asylum of the government’s budget. 
High rates of unemployment remain 
a lasting challenge to the Namibian 
economy. The officially reported figures 
usually fluctuate between 20 and 30%
58
 of 
the labor force but under its broad definition, 
the statistic would likely climb 10 to 15% 
higher. Discouraged job seekers may not 
necessarily look for work (and thus be 
counted under the strict definition of 
unemployment) but that does not mean that 
they are unable or unwilling to accept 
almost any job. However, in the case of 
Namibia, the rural areas, where most of the 
                                                          
57
 ibid. 
58
 World Bank data, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.Z
S?page=1 
population resides, do not provide the kind 
of economic opportunities that would make 
the strict definition of unemployment a more 
useful statistic. Quite to the contrary, entire 
sections, whether social or geographical, of 
the Namibian society never truly join the 
formal economy and resort to subsistence 
farming. Namibia thus remains one of the 
most unequal societies on the face of the 
Earth, a state which the Gini index of 59.7 
statistically illustrates.
59
 Though Namibia is 
an investment destination characterized by 
political stability and good infrastructure, 
the lack of (semi)skilled workers is a crucial 
problem. Unskilled labor remains abundant 
but in an economy dominated by capital-
intensive industries, its contribution towards 
the country’s growth remains limited.   
Limited employment opportunities 
are a challenge at a time when the Namibian 
population is growing and young people 
make up a crucial component of the 
population. According to the 2011 census, 
the median age in Namibia is 21 years.
60
 
This means that a growing economy and 
expansion of employment opportunities is of 
vital importance for Namibia’s future. 
 
The Bilateral Relationship Between 
Germany and Namibia 
The history of the German-Namibian 
economic relationship can be traced back to 
the Berlin Conference of 1884 when 
Germany secured the “right” to colonize 
Namibia.
61
 This initial relationship was 
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 The World Factbook, CIA, 2010. Available at: 
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rather exploitative in nature as Germany 
only opted for colonialism after reasoning 
that its activity in South West Africa, as 
Namibia was then known, could yield 
economic benefits. German traders and 
settlers such as Adolf Lüderitz had long 
wanted the German Empire to increase its 
activity in South West Africa and Berlin’s 
decision to embark on its colonial project 
was thus a gradual process rather than a 
sudden coincidence.
62
 
From the outset, Namibia has been 
Germany’s important supplier of primary 
commodities such as karakul pelts, 
diamonds, cattle, butter, fish, vanadium, 
copper ores, tin, wood, sheep and goat skins, 
cow hides, meat, cheese, lead, whale oil, 
ostrich feathers, and guano. This accounted 
to 10.7% of Germany’s import volume from 
her 15 colonies
63
 and Namibia’s role as a 
trade partner to Germany continues until the 
present day. Between 2005 and 2009, the 
import partner share that  Germany 
displayed with respect to Namibia grew 
                                                          
62
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30, issue 5, s. 689-695 [cit. 2015-04-12]. DOI: 
10.1080/000368498325679, p. 689 
from less than 2% to over 3.25%.
64
 This 
figure, however, decreased to about 1.5% in 
2013. This development is further illustrated 
by absolute numbers. Whereas between 
2005 and 2009 Namibian imports from 
German grew from about 50 million US to 
dollars to well above 200 million, the figure 
decreased between 2010 and 2013. In 2013, 
Namibia imported about 114 million US 
dollars worth of goods. The share of 
Germany in the totality of Namibian exports 
first decreased from about 3.5% to 1% 
between 2005 to 2009. Between 2010 and 
2016, the figure moved between 1.75 and 
1%. Absolute export numbers varied 
between the peak of 109 million US dollars 
in 2006 to 49 million in 2008.
65
 Naturally, 
these figures are likely to be influenced by 
the Great Recession which undermined 
world-wide demand for primary 
commodities. 
According to most recent figures, the 
two countries’ economic relationship has 
been characterized by continued bilateral 
trade, increased German foreign direct 
investment as well as development 
cooperation. In 2014, the total figure of 
bilateral trade amounted to 274 million 
euros (302 million USD); German imports 
from Namibia reached 155 million euros 
(171 million USD) and German exports to 
Namibia accounted for 119 million euros 
(131 million USD).
66
 The principal imports 
that reached Germany were non-ferrous 
metals and other raw materials. Food 
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represented another major category of 
Namibian exports to Germany. Germany’s 
main exports to Namibia were composed of 
machinery and food.
67
 The conditions for 
bilateral trade are expected to improve with 
the 2014 conclusion of the South African 
Development Community-European Union 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
which guarantees better access to the EU 
market to Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
and Namibia.  
An important German investment 
project in Namibia is Ohorongo Cement, a 
subsidiary of the Schwenk group, which was 
opened in 2011. The project represents an 
investment of approximately 250 million 
euros (275 million USD).
68
 After the United 
States, Germany is Namibia’s greatest donor 
of development aid.
69
  
 The unique nature of German-
Namibian development cooperation is 
illustrated by a recent energy project that 
combines the values of development, 
sustainability, and cooperation. The project, 
titled Energy for Future, was launched by 
the German development minister Dirk 
Niebel in 2011. The initiative attempts to 
counter a negative development that has in 
the past made sustainable agriculture 
particularly difficult – the spread of invasive 
bush. As mundane as this challenge may 
sound, it has made over 26 million hectares 
of land virtually unusable which has in turn 
led to declining number of livestock, many 
Namibians’ primary source of subsistence. 
Energy for Future introduced into the area 
harvesting machines which are capable of 
harvesting the bush and thus stopping its 
massive invasion. Furthermore, the bush is 
                                                          
67
 ibid.  
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 OECD aid statistics, available at: 
https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance_Rec
ipients/Recipients?:embed=n&:showTabs=y&:displa
y_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1 
turned into woodchips that are subsequently 
used as fuel in a nearby cement factory. 
Biomass energy generation is crucial for 
Namibia, for the country still cannot claim 
the title of an energy self-sufficient nation.
70
 
 
Development Aid Assistance 
Let us now focus on German ODA 
to Namibia in more detail. In order to 
provide a comprehensive analysis, we will 
first analyze German ODA to Namibia in 
absolute terms. Table 3 lists the forty largest 
recipients of German ODA on the African 
continent (all tables and charts are found in 
the appendix). A note on the nature of the 
data used in this analysis is appropriate here. 
First, all data on development aid were 
retrieved from the OECD International 
Development Statistics, additional data such 
as population statistics originate in the 
World Bank. We analyze net development 
aid disbursements rather than development 
aid commitments.  
Thus, the figures provided below reflect the 
actual capital received by the recipient 
country rather than mere political 
commitments. This is also crucial for our 
subsequent regression analysis, for we seek 
to quantify the actual effects that German 
ODA exerts on the Namibian economy. 
Second, Table 3 lists the mean annual figure 
for German ODA over the period from 1991 
to 2013. This data range is not only 
sufficiently wide and thus capable of 
avoiding the danger of being skewed by a 
few particularly divergent data points, it is 
also particularly relevant in the case of 
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Namibia. Before the country gained 
independence in 1990, all official ODA 
disbursements had to be channeled through 
the South African government which at that 
time illegally (according to a United Nations 
resolution) administered Namibia. Many 
donors thus refrained from development aid 
provision altogether or opted for supporting 
various NGOs. Data on aid provided 
through such channels before 1990 is both 
rare and unreliable. The period from 1991 to 
2013 is thus the most reliable and recent 
data set available.  
 A brief glimpse over Table 3 will 
suggest that in absolute terms, Namibia does 
not necessarily enjoy a special position  
among the African recipients of German 
ODA. Out of the forty largest recipients of 
German aid, Namibia ranks seventeenth and 
despite the fact that the country places well 
above the median recipient, it lags far 
behind countries of the likes of Nigeria, 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Zambia, and Ethiopia, which 
represent the five largest recipients of 
German ODA on the black continent. 
However, the careful reader should not omit 
the fact that other former German colonies 
occupy the front positions. Namely, 
Cameroon ranks second after Nigeria and 
Tanzania places sixth. Rwanda and Burundi, 
both of which formed part of German East 
Africa between 1884 and 1916, also appear 
among the forty largest recipients.  
As will become obvious in the next 
few pages, the ranking of countries 
presented above will significantly change 
once we take into account the recipient 
countries’ populations. Indeed, per capita 
levels of development aid are an entirely 
different beast. The phenomenon that is 
likely to hold some explanatory power when 
we compare Table 3 with Table 4 is termed 
population bias. Trumbull and Wall as well 
as Burnside and Dollar, for instance, have 
observed that per capita aid tends to be 
significantly higher for countries with 
relatively small populations.  
Trumbull and Wall provide one 
plausible explanation to this phenomenon by 
suggesting that “donors prefer to spend their 
limited ODA budgets where they can have 
their greatest impact per person.”71  
Berthélemy and Tichit argue that the notion 
that the effectiveness of aid increases with a 
declining population results in per capita aid 
distribution that may not be at all in accord 
with need: “some of the smallest and least 
poor developing countries, such as 
Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia receive 
high level of assistance per capita.”72   
Table 4 evidences that the 
observations of Berthélemy and Tichit hold 
true over the period of 1991 to 2013, which 
is the focus of our study. In per capita terms, 
Namibia claims the first place among all 
African recipients of German ODA. In fact, 
Namibia’s per capita figures are more than 
sixfold higher than that of a median 
recipient country in our sample of forty 
countries, which receives 2.35 US dollar per 
capita. Namibia is closely followed by 
Botswana, which receives 14.5 US dollars 
per capita and Cabo Verde, which saw itself 
receiving 11.6 US dollars of German ODA   
per capita. It is the per capita statistic that 
puts Namibia’s seventeenth place in 
absolute terms in an entirely different and 
arguably important perspective. In Table 3, 
which displays German ODA disbursements 
in absolute terms, Namibia is surrounded by 
countries such as Rwanda, Malawi, and 
Benin. These countries received similar 
mean amounts of German ODA between 
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1991 and 2013. However, their populations 
are much larger than that of Namibia. While 
Namibia’s population only surpassed the 
two-million mark recently, Rwanda, 
Malawi, and Benin house populations that 
are roughly five times as large as that of 
Namibia.  
This explains Namibia’s prime 
position among per capita recipients of 
German development aid. Importantly, 
Namibia’s first place has been solidified 
over the last decade. Even though Cabo 
Verde ranked as first at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, the country has now 
lost ground to Namibia and ranks third in 
our most recent data set.
73
  Per capita figures 
are thus the statistic that illustrates 
Germany’s extraordinary role as one of 
Namibia’s largest and most important 
donors of development aid.  
Chart 2 captures the development of 
German ODA to Namibia per capita over 
the period between 1991 and 2013. A mere 
glance over the graph  reveals that the 
already high mean figure of per capita ODA 
was, as the mathematical logic of the mean 
suggests, repeatedly surpassed over the last 
two and a half decades. In fact, per capita 
German ODA peaks twice, each time rising 
above the unprecedented level of thirty US 
dollars. Crucially, not a single time did 
German ODA to Namibia sink below five 
US dollars per capita, a level that most 
recipients of German development aid do 
not reach even in the form of mean ODA. 
The 1990s witnessed a clear positive trend 
in German development aid disbursements 
to Namibia. For reasons outlined above, 
development aid channels through which 
donors could provide capital prior to 
Namibia’s independence in 1990 were 
limited. It is thus only after the country 
gained independence that aid disbursements 
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rose significantly. The initial surge of 
German ODA disbursements is palpable in 
Chart 2.  
Even though German ODA poured 
into Namibia at a volume of about ten US 
dollars per capita at the beginning of the 
1990s, it reached the unprecedented level of 
above thirty US dollars per capita by the 
midpoint of the decade. Subsequently, the 
figures of German per capita aid decreased 
steadily (still maintained comparatively high 
levels however) until about 2006, when the 
statistic picked up again and reached the 
second highest point of 30.7 US dollars per 
capita in 2011. 
 To argue that money talks in 
political relationships when it comes to 
development aid disbursements may not be a 
novel idea but the case of Namibia provides 
relatively clear evidence of that observation. 
Out of the three main peaks of per capita aid 
disbursements that we observe in Chart 2, 
two coincide with high-profile visits of 
German politicians in Namibia. In 1995, 
when German ODA per capita to Namibia 
reached an all-time high of 31.1 US dollars, 
German chancellor Helmut Kohl paid the 
former German colony a visit. Another peak 
in per capita ODA was preceded by German 
president Roman Herzog’s visit in 1998. 
Clearly, German politicians tell the truth 
when they announce that “the worldwide 
highest per capita aid from Germany to 
Namibia is no coincidence,”74  as president 
Roman Herzog did in 1998. 
A similarly analytical approach is 
required to elucidate the degree to which 
Namibia is likely to perceive German aid as 
vital. Table 5, which depicts German ODA 
as portion of total ODA received over the 
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period between 1991 and 2013 will serve 
this purpose. In other words, it shows how 
much of its annual ODA, averaged over the 
period between 1991 and 2013, a country 
would lose if Germany were to cease its 
provision thereof. In the case of Namibia, 
German ODA represents 16.15 per cent of 
all the aid the southern African nation 
receives. In this sense, Namibia is only 
surpassed by Cameroon, which displays 
even higher dependence on German 
development assistance. However, 
Namibia’s figure is particularly high given 
the fact that Benin, for instance, a fourth 
country in the discussed list, receives 
roughly nine per cent of its development aid 
from Germany. Indeed, a much more 
common statistic among the twenty nations 
that display the highest dependency on 
German ODA revolves around five per cent.  
Compared to other countries in the 
region, Namibia displays a greater 
discrepancy between the importance of 
German aid and that of other donors. For 
instance, Schüring analyzes aid 
disbursements data for the period between 
2000 and 2001 for the four African countries 
(Botswana, Cameroon, Libya, Namibia) in 
whose case Germany was the second largest 
donor in absolute terms (Germany was not 
the largest donor for any African country in 
the 2000 – 2001 period). She finds that in 
the case of Namibia, the financial gap 
between Germany and the other donors was 
comparatively larger.
75
  In other words, the 
loss of Germany as an ODA donor would 
hurt Namibia more than if the country lost 
her other bilateral donors.
76
  The importance 
and potential of development aid have 
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 Except, of course, the first donor. At the time of 
Schüring’s analysis however, the greatest donor in 
absolute terms was the European Union, of whose aid 
Germany is an important source. 
naturally a lot to do with the structure of the 
Namibian economy, its peculiarities, 
strengths, and weaknesses. Many of such 
characteristics have in turn a lot to do with 
the colonial history whose presence the 
German government invokes as a source of 
the “special responsibility” towards 
Namibia.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 We will test three different data sets. 
The first one covers the period between 
1991 and 2013 and contains data on world 
and German ODA (hereafter termed the 
1991 data set). The second data set runs 
from 2000 to 2013 and contains world and 
German ODA as well as Namibian imports 
of world and German capital goods (2000 
data set). The last data set runs from 2000 to 
2011 and includes world and German ODA 
as well as Namibian governmental capital 
formation outlays. See the section Data for 
more information. 
The Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Model Adjusted for Foreign Aid 
 The model of Namibia’s gross 
domestic product is derived from pure 
production function theory which assumes 
that all production is some combination of 
labor and capital. The usual assumptions are 
therefore implied: if labor or capital 
becomes entirely unavailable, production 
will come to a halt; the marginal 
productivity of labor is proportional to 
average labor productivity; the marginal 
productivity of capital is proportional to the 
average productivity of capital. We will 
assume the Chenery-Strout understanding of 
foreign development assistance as a low-
cost source of capital. Even though this 
understanding has been problematized in 
recent literature, the likes of Easterly base 
their criticism mainly on the claim that 
economic growth is related to physical 
Vladimir Chlouba 
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capital investment to a lesser extent than is 
assumed by the Chenery-Strout logic. 
However, it must be noted that in the case of 
our study, this criticism is likely to miss its 
target. First, it has been thoroughly 
evidenced throughout the overview of the 
Namibian economy provided above that 
Namibia’s economic well-being is likely to 
be determined by physical capital accretion. 
Extraction of mineral resources, the 
backbone of the Namibian economy, is 
obviously dependent on sufficient capital 
necessary for the smooth operation of 
Namibia’s mines. Second, Namibia is 
characterized by relatively high levels of 
unemployment as well as a high share of 
unskilled workers within the labor force. 
Thus, the limiting factor of Namibia’s 
economic growth, at least for the foreseeable 
future, seems to be rooted in capital, not 
labor, accretion.  
Yet another line of criticism of the 
Chenery-Strout logic bases its validity on 
the claim that a certain, and perhaps large, 
portion of foreign aid is consumed, not 
invested. We partially curtail the viability of 
this critique by testing for various kinds of 
aid, thus examining aid’s fungibility. 
Furthermore, the second part of our analysis 
estimates the effect of aid on government 
expenditure on capital formation, likely one 
of the prime channels through which aid is 
potentially consumed. The consumed 
portion of aid is thus expected to be detected 
in one form (tests for disaggregated aid) or 
another (government capital formation 
expenditure). 
Assuming pure production function 
theory, let Namibia’s GDP for the period 
1991 – 2013 (alternatively 2000 – 2013) be  
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝑞, 𝜆)                            (1) 
where Y is Namibia’s real GDP in US 
dollars (US $), F is the transformation rule 
associating Y and q, q is Namibia’s vector 
of explanatory inputs and λ is a Hicks 
neutral rate of technical change. Assuming a 
multiplicative aid-augmented Cobb-Douglas 
production function,
77
 we arrive at the 
following equation: 
𝑌 =  𝜃𝐿𝛼𝐾𝛽𝐴𝛾exp (𝜆𝑡 + µ)            (2) 
where L is labor, K is capital, A is official 
development aid disbursements, t is time, µ 
is the normally distributed error term, and α, 
β, and γ are the estimated coefficients. 
Naturally, it is assumed that L, K, and A are 
independent. Our preliminary analysis of the 
1991 data set tests the effects of 
disaggregated official development 
assistance in the following form: 
 
𝑌 =
 𝜃𝐿𝛼𝐾𝛽𝐴𝑊𝐺
𝛾 𝐴𝑊𝑇
𝛿 𝐴𝑊𝐿
𝜀 𝐴𝐺𝐺
ζ
𝐴𝐺𝑇
η
𝐴𝐺𝐿
ι exp (𝜆𝑡 +
µ)          (3) 
 
where AWG are ODA grants received from 
all of Namibia’s donors but Germany 
(world), AWT is world technical cooperation, 
AWL are world ODA total net loans, AGG are 
German-originating ODA grants, AGT is 
German-originating technical cooperation, 
AGL are German-originating ODA total net 
loans, t is time, µ is the normally distributed 
error term, and α, β, γ, δ, ε, ζ, η, and ι are the 
estimated coefficients. 
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 The 2000 dataset includes imports of capital 
goods and the preliminary analysis was 
based on the following model:  
 
𝑌 =
 𝜃𝐿𝛼𝐾𝑁
𝛽
𝐾𝑊
𝛾 𝐾𝐺
𝛿𝐴𝑊𝐺
𝜀 𝐴𝑊𝑇
ζ
𝐴𝑊𝐿
η
𝐴𝐺𝐺
ι 𝐴𝐺𝑇
κ 𝐴𝐺𝐿
ν exp (𝜆𝑡 +
µ)            (4) 
 
 
where 𝐾𝑁 represents accumulated Namibian 
capital, KW stands for Namibian imports of 
world capital goods, and 𝐾𝐺 represents 
Namibian imports of German capital goods. 
It is assumed the capital goods will perform 
the role of capital in the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, hence the letter K. In 
order to avoid double counting, 𝐾𝑁, 
accumulated Namibian capital, is defined as 
total capital minus Namibian imports of 
German and world capital goods: 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐾 −
 𝐾𝐺 − 𝐾𝑊.   
   
We will also run the above regressions using 
lagged ODA and lagged capital goods in 
order to test for the independent variables’ 
delayed effects. The variables will be lagged 
by one year.  
         
Government Expenditure on Capital 
Formation Model 
A large portion of the aid-expenditure 
debate has employed large samples of cross-
sectional data. Despite the fact that these 
studies are in many cases both theoretically 
and methodologically sound, their nature 
limits the extent to which they can consider 
country-specific situations. The literature 
review provided above suggests that case 
studies of individual countries are necessary 
to supplement studies relying on cross-
sectional as well as panel data and thus yield 
additional understanding of the relationship 
between foreign aid and government 
expenditure. Largely because we are above 
all interested in determining the relationship 
between public capital formation 
expenditure and foreign aid, we will employ 
relatively simple methodology that follows 
the studies of Pack & Pack and Cashel-
Cordo & Craig.
78
 These studies do not rely 
on any specific theoretical framework but 
for the purpose of our limited interest in one 
dependent variable, this is not perceived as 
an obstacle. Specifically, we express 
government expenditure on capital 
formation in the following manner:  
 
𝐺𝐶𝐹 = 𝑓(𝐴)             (5) 
 
where GCF is annual government 
expenditure directed to capital formation 
and A stands for official development 
assistance disbursements. This general 
relationship assumes in our case the 
following form: 
𝐺𝐶𝐹 =  𝜃 + 𝛼𝐴 + 𝜇     (6) 
 
where µ is the normally distributed error 
term. The model tested in preliminary 
analysis took the following form: 
 
𝐺𝐶𝐹 =  𝜃 + 𝛼𝐴𝑊𝐺 + 𝛽𝐴𝑊𝑇 + 𝛾𝐴𝑊𝐿 +
𝛿𝐴𝐺𝐺 + 𝜀𝐴𝐺𝑇 + ζ𝐴𝐺𝐿 + 𝜇     (7) 
Similarly to the Cobb-Douglas equations 
that were explained in the previous section, 
we will broaden our analysis by using aid 
data lagged by one year in order to test for 
delayed effects. 
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Data 
 Our study focuses on the period 
between 1991  and 2013. The exceptions are 
equations measuring the effects of capital 
goods on Namibian GDP and the capital 
formation equations. The reason for a 
smaller data set is rather practical – reliable 
data does not stretch far enough. Whenever 
capital goods enter our estimations, they 
refer to a shorter data set which begins in 
2000 and ends in 2013. Capital formation 
data cover the period between 2000 and 
2011. Data pertaining to official 
developlment assistance disbursements were 
retrieved from the OECD International 
Development Statistics. Data of Namibia’s 
imports of capital goods originate in the 
World Integrated Trade Solution database of 
the World Bank. Data of Namibia’s gross 
domestic product were retrieved from the 
World Economic Outlook Database of the 
International Monetary Fund. Data of 
Namibia’s capital inputs come from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. One 
additional note is appropriate here. Because 
the available data end in 2011, two missing 
observations (for the years 2012 and 2013) 
had to be calculated using Namibia’s figures 
of annual GDP and rate of capital formation 
as share of GDP. In other words, if we know 
the total size of Namibia’s capital and the 
rate at which new capital is added anually, 
we can calculate the annual increments and 
arrive at total capital figures. The magnitude 
of Namibia’s labor inputs was calculated 
using the size of Namibia’s labor force and 
rate of employment. Both of these statistics 
were retrieved from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank.  
Another note is needed here. Even 
though most of the data provided by such 
institutions as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank is generally 
reliable, unemployment statistics are likely 
to be somewhat inaccurate. First, the 
aforementioned international institutions 
rely almost entirely on domestic institutions 
for their collection. Second, the difference 
between data collected under the strict and 
loose definition of unemployment can vary 
significantly. This means, given the size of 
Namibia’s informal economy, that the 
unemployment statistics have to be taken 
with a grain of salt. Gaomab suggests, for 
instance, that the 2004 statistics of 
Namibia’s rate of unemployment should be 
viewed with increased caution because the 
Namibia Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey of 2004 found that the 
share of households living in extreme 
poverty declined from 8.7 to 3.9 per cent 
between 1994 and 2004. These findings 
seem to contradict the Labour Force Survey 
of 2004 since it is usually assumed that an 
increasing rate of unemployment is 
positively related to rates of poverty.
79
 As 
has been indicated above, labor, unlike 
capital, is not likely to be a limiting factor of 
Namibia’s economic growth, yet increased 
caution when it comes to interpreting our 
data is entirely appropriate.  When it comes 
to statistics of government expenditure on 
capital formation, the National Accounts 
produced by the Namibia Statistics Agency 
served as our source. All data points were 
converted into US dollars using the annual 
average exchange rate. 
 
Estimations and Tests 
 It is entirely within the realm of 
possibility that variables Y, K, and A are 
simultanous and endogenous. In our study, 
they are assumed exogenous, so that use can 
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be made of the single equation OLS 
estimation method with the classical linear 
regression assumptions about the random 
error term (µ). Equations 3 and 4 are 
estimated as log-log linear models, i. e.  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌 =  𝜃 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐿 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐾 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑊𝐺 +
𝛿𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑊𝑇 + 𝜀𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑊𝐿 + ζln𝐴𝐺𝐺 +  ηln𝐴𝐺𝑇 +
ιln𝐴𝐺𝐿 + 𝜆𝑡 +  µ                                          (8) 
In the case of capital goods, the log-log 
linear model assumes the following form: 
 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌 =  𝜃 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐿 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑁 + γ𝑙𝑛𝐾𝐺 +
δ𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑊 + 𝜀𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑊𝐺 + ζ𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑊𝑇 + η𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑊𝐿 +
ιln𝐴𝐺𝐺 +  κln𝐴𝐺𝑇 + νln𝐴𝐺𝐿 + +𝜆𝑡 +  µ  (9) 
The government capital formation 
expenditure determination linear model is 
estimated as equation (7), which has already 
been introduced above.  
 
These regression models imply the 
following hypothesis tests:  
 
The importance of German and world aid in 
the Y equation (8): Either H01:  the 
appropriate coefficents (γ, δ, ε, ζ, η, and ι) 
will be 0 or HA2: the appropriate coefficents 
will have a non-zero value.  
 
The importance of German and world 
capital goods in the Y equation (9): Either 
H01:  the appropriate coefficents (𝛾, 𝛿) will 
be 0 or HA2: the appropriate coefficents will 
have a non-zero value.  
 
The importance of German and world aid in 
the public capital expenditure equation (7): 
Either H01:  the appropriate coefficents (α, β, 
γ, δ, ε, ζ) will be 0 or HA2: the appropriate 
coefficents will have a non-zero value.  
 
It is unnecessary to write out all of the 
specific hypotheses, for all are derived 
analogically. Let us lastly reiterate that we 
will estimate equations 7, 8, and 9. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Preliminary parameter tests have 
found the rate of technical change (λ) to be 
highly correlated with capital and often 
insignificant and the variable was therefore 
dropped from the final estimations. 
Similarly, a number of independent 
variables (these will be soon discussed) was 
dropped from the estimations because they 
consistently exhibited t-values smaller than 
unity. The final results are presented in 
Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, all of which are 
found in the appendix. In accordance with 
the equations discussed above, table 6 
presents the results for equation 8. Table 7 
features the same equation, this time 
estimated using lagged foreign aid. Table 8 
features equation 9, which incorporates both 
foreign aid and capital goods. Table 9 
presents foreign aid and capital goods as 
lagged variables. The lagged variables were 
lagged by one year as longer delays in their 
effect on Namibia’s GDP are neither 
expected, nor theoretically plausible. 
Most of the results for the Cobb-
Douglas production functions have 
reasonable goodness of fit, as their R
2
 are 
relatively high (0.94 and above). Perhaps the 
most noticable result is the fact that 
domestic capital possesses a decisive 
explanatory power when it comes to 
determining Namibia’s GDP. Especially in 
the equations that incorporated the 1991 aid 
data, domestic capital exerted strong 
positive influence, with coefficients above 1. 
What this means is that if capital available 
for the production process increases by one 
per cent, the corresponding change in 
Namibia’s GDP, all other things constant, 
will be larger than one per cent. 
Furthermore, the mentioned coefficients are 
highly significant, in most cases at the 1 per 
cent level.  
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Even though we expected the effect 
of labor inputs to be somewhat lower than 
that of capital, our results surpass our 
expectations. In fact, labor appears to be 
statistically insignificant and its coefficients 
are either low or negative in equations that 
use the 1991 dataset. A number of 
explanations can be offered. First, Namibia 
is characterized by abundant labor force 
while at the same time, its economy is 
centered around capital-intensive industries. 
This means that accretion of physical 
capital, not labor inputs, will continue to be 
crucial for Namibia’s economic 
performance. Naturally, a growing national 
economy does not necessarily have to, and 
has not, benefited the entire population 
equally as Namibia’s high Gini coefficient 
indicates. In fact, Namibia’s growing 
population tames the kinds of optimistic 
interpretations that compare the country’s 
rate of growth to countries with lower rates 
of population growth. In Namibia’s case, 
economic growth naturally needs to be 
higher in order to surpass the rate of 
population growth and still enlarge per 
capita economic output. As long as 
population growth remains considerable and 
unemployment relatively high, the economy 
is not likely to experience a shortage of 
unskilled labor. Second, the very fact that a 
large portion of the country’s labor force is 
unskilled means that those sectors of the 
Namibian economy that seek skilled 
workers will not be able to find them.  This 
is arguably one of the reasons why foreign 
investment opportunities in Namibia have 
not been exhausted. Though the absolute 
numbers of employed Namibian workers 
have increased, we may suspect that this 
growth was largely driven by unskilled 
labor. Even though labor reports of statistics 
agencies speak of ever increasing numbers, 
the situation in the labor market has changed 
relatively little for employers seeking skilled 
or semi-skilled workers. Lastly, statistics of 
labor inputs have to be viewed with 
scepticism. As has been noted under the 
section Data above, it has been suggested 
that our numbers may not entirely 
correspond to reality. 
When emphasizing that capital plays 
a crucial role in Namibia’s production 
function, we must not forget to add that we 
are referring to both domestic and imported 
capital. We reject our null hypothesis 
concerning the importance of world capital 
goods in favor of the alternative. In fact, 
world capital goods have a positive effect on 
the GDP of Namibia that is significant at the 
one per cent level. Furthermore, the 
coefficient on the natural log of world 
capital goods is almost as high as that on the 
natural log of world development aid grants, 
which means that imports of capital goods 
could potentially be seen as an alternative to 
certain kinds of ODA. This suggestion only 
gains currency when we once again reiterate 
that domestic capital is of crucial importance 
and that imports of capital goods will, 
ideally and ultimately, contribute to 
domestic capital accummulation.  
However, we fail to reject our null 
hypothesis concerning the importance of 
German capital goods because equations 
that incorporated imports of German-
originating capital goods as a variable 
indicate that these imports do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the 
economy. Lack of direct statistical evidence 
notwithstanding, we dare to suggest that 
considerable imports of capital goods might 
(especially after these become part of 
domestic capital) exert a positive influence 
on the Namibian economy.  
Finally, let us focus on the role that 
official development assistance plays in 
determining the gross domestic product of 
Namibia. The effect German foreign aid 
appears to be relatively negligible. As a 
result of preliminary estimations, which 
made it clear that coefficients on German 
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aid are either negative or statistically 
insignificant and almost invariably with t-
values less than unity,  German ODA was 
dropped from the final estimation of 
equation 8. We fail to reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative one, 
which contends that German aid has a non-
zero effect on Namibia’s GDP. The only 
exception is German technical aid which 
featured in the final estimation of equation 
9. German technical aid was significant with 
a positive coefficient at the ten per cent level 
in this estimation. This, however, is too little 
to alter the general conclusion that the 
impact of German ODA is insignificant. In 
this respect, this study differs with Amavilah 
who concluded, working with data that 
covered the period from 1985 to 1995, that 
German aid does have a positive and  
statistically significant effect on Namibian 
GDP.
80
 
World aid, on the other hand, 
exhibited relatively robust influence over 
Namibia’s GDP. In the estimation of 
equation 8, world ODA grants were 
significant at the five per cent level with an 
arithmetically correct coefficient. When 
lagged by one year, world ODA grants 
exhibited an even higher statistical 
significance at the one per cent level. This 
was also true for world technical aid and our 
hypotheses for these kinds of world aid have 
been rejected in favor of the alternatives.  
The coefficient on world grants in the non-
lagged equation was 0.705 which means that 
if grants are increased by one per cent, 
everything else constant, Namibia’s GDP 
will grow by 0.71 per cent.  
A considerably more robust 
influence of foreing aid is detected in the 
public investment equation (7), which had 
exceptional goodness of fit (0.99). Both 
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German and world aid seem to be of higher 
significance for public expenditure devoted 
to capital formation than for the gross 
domestic product. The null hypotheses for 
all three kinds of world aid and German 
ODA loans have been rejected in favor of 
the alternatives. When the independent 
variables are lagged by one year, we also 
reject the null hypotheses for German grants 
and German technical aid, although only 
German technical aid has the expected 
arithmetical coefficent. Several of the 
independent variables are significant at the 
one and five per cent levels. Importantly, 
our results suggest that, all else constant, a 
one-dollar increase in aid would increase 
government expenditure on capital 
formation by more than one dollar. This 
means that ODA can not only serve as a 
direct source of capital, but that it can also 
motivate the recipient government to match 
the donors and further increase investment.  
We can establish that the direct as 
well as indirect effects of foreign aid on 
governmental capital formation outlays are 
considerable. The results for disaggregated 
aid suggest that grants are of particular 
importance to public investment. Indeed, the 
portion of world aid that is represented by 
grants was highly significant while the other 
types of aid exhibited negative coefficients 
of smaller significance. This could perhaps 
be explained by the fact that grants are 
typically somewhat more fungible than, say, 
technical assistance.  While technical 
assitance is only devoted to specific 
projects, grants offer the recipient 
governments more flexibility when it comes 
to determinig which investment project are 
to be bolstered by aid. Of the German 
independent variables, ODA loans were 
significant at the one per cent level. 
The results for lagged aid, presented 
in Table 11 in the appendix, corroborate the 
notion that grants are of particular 
importance for capital formation 
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expenditure. In fact, the coefficient on 
lagged world grants is higher than that on 
non-lagged world grants which could mean 
that past grants create positive expectations 
on the part of the government which is more 
willing to increase next year’s investment 
budget. This notion would make some sense 
when we consider the budgetary process 
which commences long before the fiscal 
year starts and if aid flows are to influence 
the recipient countries’ governments’ fiscal 
behavior it is likely to do so based on future 
expectations rather than current 
disbursements. Of the German lagged 
independent variables, technical aid was 
significant at the ten per cent level. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examined the impact of German 
sources of capital on the Namibian 
economy. We have tested the effects of 
German development assistance as well as 
Namibian imports of  German capital goods 
on Namibia’s GDP. Subsequently, we have 
compared German development assistance 
and capital goods to resources flowing from 
all of Namibia’s donors and trading partners 
to determine whether German sources of 
capital play a particular role. Our work 
suggests that German development aid has 
almost no statistically significant impact on 
the Namibian gross domestic product. 
Similarly, Namibian imports of German 
capital goods seemed to make little 
difference in our model.  
However, ODA disbursements from 
other donors than Germany did appear to 
play a statistically significant role. World 
grants and world technical aid had a positive 
impact on the Namibian economy, measured 
through its GDP. Futhermore, Namibian 
imports of world capital goods exhibited a 
strong positive impact on the Namibian 
economy. Therefore, we reason that 
boosting Namibia’s well-being through 
imports of capital goods may be just as, if 
not more, effective as ODA provision.  
We have further established that 
domestic capital is of critical importance for 
Namibia’s economic well-being. 
Augmenting domestic capital through 
foreign direct investment, for instance, 
seems to be yet another possible alternative 
to official development assistance. Our tests 
also suggest that the Namibian labor force is 
a comparatively less important factor in the 
country’s production function. In order to 
change this, transform the Namibian 
economy itself, and ensure long-term 
growth, policy makers have to provide 
Namibia’s workers with adequate training 
and education opportunities. 
However, we have found evidence 
that foreign aid does have a statistically 
significant effect on public expenditures 
directed to capital formation. This is 
particularly true for world grants and  
technical aid as well as German technical 
aid and ODA loans. In the case of German 
aid, our results thus are, as it were, 
somewhat paradoxical. Even though we 
have concluded that boosting domestic 
capital will have a positive effect on the 
country’s gross domestic product, German 
develpment aid, which seems to motivate 
the government to invest in capital 
formation, is of little significance to the 
country’s GDP. The most likely explanation 
is that the link between aid disbursements, 
government capital formation outlays, 
actual capital formation, and the gross 
domestic product could be broken, or at least 
imperfect. We have established that foreign 
aid likely augments public investment and 
that capital improvements will exert a 
positive effect on Namibia’s GDP. The 
locus where the aforementioned link could 
be broken is thus between government 
capital formation outlays and actual capital 
formation. Let us remind the reader that our 
regressions work with the budgeted capital 
formation figures. Whether the budgeted 
figures correspond to actual outlays is a 
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question that could be taken up by future 
research. What is important, the 
aforementioned link does not seem to be 
broken in the case of world aid. In this light, 
it is easy to see, aside from political 
motivation, why German aid provision 
continues despite weak statistical evidence 
that it influences the Namibian economy. 
First, if world aid can make a difference,it is 
likely that German aid, too, will matter. 
Second, German aid has an effect on the 
government’s spending behavior which is a 
considerable outcome in itself. 
Future research might further 
consider some of the results obtained in this 
study and subject them to a rigorous analysis 
using more comprehensive methods. For 
instance, some of the independent variables 
in our study likely suffer from collinearity 
and a diverse methodological treatment of 
our topic might uncover  the extent to which 
this biases the results. Furthermore, future 
studies could consider some of the 
relationships that have been merely 
suggested in this work. For instance, the 
relative importance of imports of capital 
goods for the Namibian gross domestic 
product would benefit from detailed 
investigation. Lastly, Namibia’s case should 
be compared to other contries in the region 
in order to determine whether the former 
German colony is a unique case or an 
instance of a more durable trend.
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2009 2013
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 9.0 6.1
Fishing only 4.2 3.1
Mining & quarrying 11.8 14.2
Manufacturing 14.1 13.2
Electricity, gas & water 2.2 2.0
Construction 3.5 4.1
Whosale & retail trade; repair of vehicles, 
household goods; restaurants, hotels
Hotels and restaurants only 1.8 1.8
Transport, storage, and communication 5.6 4.8
Finance, real estate, and business services 16.6 15.8
Public administration and defence 11.0 13.0
Other services 12.3 13.0
13.9 13.9
TABLE 1 - GDP by Sector (% at current prices)
2005/2006 2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014
e
2014/2015
p
2015/2016
p
Tax revenue 24.9 25.7 31.4 32.1 35.4 33.5 31.8
Total expenditure and net lending 27.4 34.8 34.4 35.7 32.9 30.4 30.3
Current expenditure 24.0 29.2 28.9 32.1 30.5 27.8 27.8
Wages and salaries 12.2 12.9 10.8 14.5 11.2 11.4 10.9
Capital expenditure 3.0 5.0 4.2 3.0 2.4 2.6 2.5
TABLE 2 - Public Finances (% of GDP at  current prices)
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1 Nigeria 146,729           21 Liberia 26,987            
2 Cameroon 122,836           22 Botswana 25,967            
3 DRC 91,583            23 Senegal 25,067            
4 Zambia 79,876            24 Niger 23,233            
5 Ethiopia 77,219            25 Chad 20,770            
6 Tanzania 71,915            26 Madagascar 17,567            
7 Mozambique 71,287            27 Burundi 17,063            
8 Kenya 62,844            28 Guinea 16,999            
9 Ghana 53,192            29 Togo 14,952            
10 South Africa 47,357            30 Mauritania 13,701            
11 Mali 40,373            31 Congo 13,527            
12 Uganda 40,066            32 Sierra Leone 11,888            
13 Burkina Faso 37,592            33 Angola 11,819            
14 Côte d'Ivoire 34,395            34 Somalia 9,963              
15 Benin 33,770            35 Lesotho 7,436              
16 Malawi 31,757            36 Central Af. Rep. 6,883              
17 Namibia 30,370            37 Eritrea 5,494              
18 Rwanda 29,836            38 Cabo Verde 5,145              
19 Zimbabwe 29,215            39 South Sudan 3,753              
20 Sudan 28,718            40 Gambia 2,589              
TABLE 3 - mean ODA given by Germany in thousands of US $ over the 
period 1991 - 2013
1 Namibia 15.8                21 Zimbabwe 2.3                 
2 Botswana 14.5                22 Burundi 2.3                 
3 Cabo Verde 11.6                23 Chad 2.2                 
4 Liberia 8.9                 24 Côte d'Ivoire 2.0                 
5 Cameroon 7.2                 25 Seychelles 2.0                 
6 Zambia 7.0                 26 Tanzania 2.0                 
7 Sao Tome and Pr. 6.8                 27 Gambia 1.9                 
8 Mauritania 4.7                 28 Kenya 1.9                 
9 Benin 4.5                 29 Niger 1.9                 
10 Congo 4.1                 30 Guinea 1.8                 
11 Lesotho 4.0                 31 Central Af. Rep. 1.8                 
12 Mozambique 3.6                 32 DRC 1.7                 
13 Rwanda 3.6                 33 Djibouti 1.6                 
14 Mali 3.3                 34 Uganda 1.5                 
15 Burkina Faso 3.0                 35 Eritrea 1.4                 
16 Togo 2.9                 36 Somalia 1.3                 
17 Ghana 2.6                 37 Nigeria 1.1                 
18 Malawi 2.6                 38 Ethiopia 1.1                 
19 Sierra Leone 2.5                 39 South Africa 1.1                 
20 Senegal 2.4                 40 Madagascar 1.0                 
TABLE 4 - German ODA per capita in US $ over the period 1991 - 2013
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1 Cameroon 18.04              11 Burkina Faso 5.81                
2 Namibia 16.15              12 Ghana 5.28                
3 Nigeria 10.56              13 Malawi 5.09                
4 Benin 8.83                14 Rwanda 5.00                
5 Zambia 8.40                15 Mozambique 4.95                
6 South Africa 7.38                16 Tanzania 4.22                
7 Zimbabwe 6.35                17 Ethiopia 4.20                
8 Mali 6.04                18 Côte d'Ivoire 4.05                
9 DRC 6.04                19 Uganda 3.62                
10 Kenya 5.85                20 Sudan 2.85                
TABLE 5 - German ODA as % of total ODA received by top 20 recipients of 
German ODA over the period 1991 - 2013
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TABLE 6 -  Aid 
Parameter Equation 8 
constant -15.769 (-3.51)*** 
ln_capital 1.263 (5.25)*** 
ln_world_grants 0.705 (2.84)** 
ln_world_technical 0.259 (2.09)* 
ln_world_loans 0.015 (0.67) 
ln_german_grants -0.296 (-0.92) 
ln_german_technical 0.174 (0.44) 
R
2
 0.96 
Adj. R
2
 0.94 
observations 21 
T-values in parentheses; * ten per cent, ** five  
per cent, *** one per cent significance. 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 - Lagged Aid 
Parameter Equation 8 
constant -16.774 (-5.77)*** 
ln_capital 1.411 (10.92)*** 
ln_world_grants_lag 0.507 (2.97)*** 
ln_world_technical_lag 0.265 (2.49)** 
ln_german_grants_lag -0.434 (-1.45) 
ln_german_technical_lag 0.412 (1.10) 
R
2
 0.95 
Adj. R
2
 0.94 
observations 22 
T-values in parentheses; * ten per cent, ** five  
per cent, *** one per cent significance. 
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TABLE 8 - Aid and Capital Goods 
Parameter Equation 9 
constant 7.644 (-1.17) 
ln_capital -0.976 (-1.02) 
ln_labor 2.027 (2.24)* 
ln_german_grants -1.529 (-2.20)* 
ln_german_technical 1.978 (2.11)* 
ln_world_goods 0.676 (3.53)*** 
R
2
 0.96 
Adj. R
2
 0.93 
observations 14 
T-values in parentheses; * ten per cent, ** five  
per cent, *** one per cent significance. 
 
 
 
TABLE 9 - Lagged Indp. Variables 
Parameter Equation 9 
constant -18.238 (-1.45) 
ln_capital 2.216 (1.17) 
ln_labor -1.388 (-0.83) 
ln_wworld_grants_lag 0.461 (0.54) 
ln_world_technical_lag 0.613 (1.80) 
ln_world_loans_lag 0.043 (0.74) 
ln_german_grants_lag -0.476 (-0.41) 
ln_german_technical_lag 0.735 (0.57) 
ln_german_loans_lag 0.003 (0.08) 
R
2
 0.95 
Adj. R
2
 0.85 
observations 13 
T-values in parentheses; * ten per cent, ** five  
per cent, *** one per cent significance. 
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TABLE 10 - Capital Formation 
Parameter Equation 7 
constant 20262.82 (0.43) 
world_grants 2.941 (11.92)*** 
world_technical -1.791 (-3.05)** 
world_loans -1.723(-3.08)** 
german_grants -10.231 (-1.62) 
german_technical 7.053 (1.03) 
german_loans 4.085 (6.25)*** 
R
2
 0.99 
Adj. R
2
 0.98 
observations 12 
T-values in parentheses; * ten per cent, ** five  
per cent, *** one per cent significance. 
 
 
 
TABLE 11 - Lagged Aid 
Parameter Equation 7 
constant -289.505.5 (-3.10)** 
world_grants_lag 3.625 (7.98)*** 
world_technical_lag 2.756 (2.39)* 
german_grants_lag -24.233 (-2.53)** 
german_technical_lag 29.248 (2.32)* 
R
2
 0.95 
Adj. R
2
 0.92 
observations 11 
T-values in parentheses; * ten per cent, ** five  
per cent, *** one per cent significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
